i do not feel that Nistiman's questions in beginning this thread have been adequately addressed and, subsequently, much wrong or one-sided information has been disseminated. such information must be challenged.
my comments will take the bakurî kurds as their focus, but i think that they can be applied, as situation permits, to all of occupied kurdistan.
first of all, as to the legitimacy of armed sturggle, yes, Nistiman, i agree that armed struggle is a legitimate course of action for Kurds. . . perhaps especially for kurds given the facts that:
1. as Nistiman correctly points out, the turkish government has completely failed to engage in any dialog with any kurdish organization.
2. as Nistiman correctly points out, the turkish government has failed to engage in dialog during any of the pkk ceasefires.
3. the turkish government has done absolutely nothing to repair the damage it caused in turkish-occupied kurdistan even as it engaged in a "negative peace" during the five-year ceasefire from 1999 to 2004--or should i say from 2002 to 2004 when military law was finally lifted?
4. the un general assembly has, over time, approved the right for all peoples struggling under foreign, colonial, and/or racist rule to use violence to secure their rights to self-determination and independence. since this is so, can the right to use armed struggle to obtain federal/autonomous status for the purpose of securing ethnic survival be less of a right?
since pkk had laid down its weapons from 1999 to 2004 and, since during that time, no democratic opposition was permitted to the kurds by the turkish state, what is the point of democratic opposition? i use the 1999 to 2004 time frame here merely because it is the most recent and longest-lasting example of ceasefire on the part of pkk. there were other ceasefires before and there was a month-long ceasefire recently.
we also have the fact that pkk has evolved over time and i believe that the early calls of the pkk for ceasefire and dialog indicate that the armed struggle was secondary to and supportive of the political struggle. the pkk is not anarchic and has not used violence strictly for the sake of violence, but to emphasize political demands which the turkish state has failed to address. do not tell me that recent innovations and changes in law are meaningful because, in practice on the ground, these changes have come to nothing. seriously, what is a few hours of restricted kurdish-language broadcasting supposed to do? it is an example of a little bit of foundation applied to the official turkish face in a vain attempt to cover serious flaws when, in fact, what is needed is major plastic surgery.
the entire ideological basis of the existence of the turkish state and whatever "legitimacy" it has to rule over kurds derives from a total denial of the existence of kurds themselves. the only reason that there is a faint acknowledgement of the existence of kurds by the turkish state today is because ozal made the remark publicly while he occupied a major political office and it is too embarrassing to go back and try to purge his comments from the public record.
as Nistiman has remarked, the turkish state does not fail to negotiate with kurds because of pkk. the turkish state fails to negotiate with kurds because they are kurds, and it does not matter who or what kurds are because they are living proof that turkish state ideology is a lie. the very existence of even a single kurd proves the lie that is the turkish state, including its borders.
Nistiman asks if an alternative kurdish opposition is created without the backing of kurdish (i.e. pkk) arms, does anyone believe the pashas will negotiate? no. i do not believe this will happen. was it an "alternative, peaceful, democratic" means by which the bashurî kurds arrived at the 1970 agreement with ba'athi iraq? i believe it was not. rather, it was sustained military resistance on the part of the bashurî which finally wrested some cultural rights from baghdad. but even at that point, it would have been complete foolhardiness to have sent the peşmêrge home, as subsequent history has proven.
to think that the majority of the population should be behind the gerîlas would be something like waiting for godot. if that is the case, then the american revolution was completely illegitimate because the majority of the population of the british colonies in north america were not for revolution. the population was roughly divided in thirds--loyalists, revolutionaries and fence-sitters. that population certainly did not face the pressures that kurds in turkish-occupied kurdistan face and, therefore, had the time to think about what position they would take.
so kurds have had no such luxury. . . unless they are in diaspora. is it valid to imply that once a kurd crosses a border out of "the territorial integrity of the turkish republic" that they have no more validity or legitimacy to discuss or influence what is happening within turkish-occupied kurdistan or to kurds in western turkey? do they not have relatives and friends still in kurdistan? i don't understand the mindset that creates this implication because it is false. historically, kurdish nationalist movements have been greatly influenced by kurds outside of kurdistan, whether they were in istanbul or further away. if not for this diaspora, kurdish issues would still be hidden behind the borders of the occupying countries where no one would know what horrors were taking place. instead, thanks to kurds in diaspora. . . including pkk supporters, the kurdish issue has become an international one. diaspora kurds still have contact with relatives and friends inside kurdistan so to say that they don't know what is going on is also false.
the idea that turkey was only murdering kurds in the 80s and 90s is false. come on! do we really have to go into detail on all the rebellions since şêx said and turkish responses to them? on second thought, maybe we should, because turkish responses to repeated kurdish rebellions were definite overkill. ethnic cleansing and murder began long ago and the turkish state targetted even those kurds who had had no part in those rebellions. it was a complete scorched earth policy, something the turks must have learned from their practice on the armenians. turkish reaction in the 80s and 90s was a logical continuation of the policies and behaviors of the turkish state from the day of its founding. pkk or no pkk--it makes no difference.
everyone can continue to cry about how pkk murdered civilians at the beginning, but they were outdone by the murders and other atrocious behavior of turkish security forces. around 1990, pkk ceased attacks on civilians while the turkish state did not. i suspect that growing kurdish civil resistance to the state at that time was a direct result of pkk's change in policy because everyone could clearly see who was murdering civilians--and the state is still doing this, witness the murder of ahmet and ugur kaymaz. from mid-1980s to mid-1990's, pkk began to win the hearts and minds of the population on the ground in kurdistan. it adapted itself to religious sensitivities, ceased targeting civilians, began calls for ceasefire and negotiation, eventually adopted the geneva conventions. . .it was a masterful piece of psychological operations and strategy and pkk had become the most serious threat to ankara that there had ever been.
friends of mine in amed view pkk as an organization that defends the people of kurdistan. i seriously doubt that any kurd would say that pkk has done nothing for kurdish nationalism, even if they don't agree with everything pkk has done or does now, or even if they are critical of pkk's policies, as Nistiman stated in the opening to this thread. furthermore, i don't think that pkk can or should be excluded from the future of kurdayetî, no matter how much turkey and others want to scream and justify pkk "terrorism." their screams and justifications are, at best, only half-truths because those who do the loudest screaming and most earnest justifications of the "pkk terrorist" label are those who selectively avoid the ugly details of the turkish founding ideology and the atrocities of the turkish state against kurds since the founding of the republic.
yes, at best only half-truths, because i have not gone into the moral aspects of the question of state responsibility for the protection of those it claims as its citizens.
in fact, i can state the matter even more strongly and say that it is not simply atrocities that turkey has committed against kurds, but it is a genocide. here we have a state, turkey, that has for 80 + years engaged in policies of slaughter, ethnic cleansing and repression of culture. the final goal, or shall i say "final solution," that is apparent from this behavior is nothing less than genocide because if a kurd no longer thinks as a kurd or expresses himself as a kurd and has no inner sense of being as a kurd, then can we say that such a person is, in fact, a kurd? if all memory of kurdishness is erased, do kurds exist?
at such a point there is no longer any transfer of the culture from one generation to another, no longer any cultural education, so to speak. as such, according to the kemalists' own ideological source, ziya gokalp, the culture no longer exists and one cannot say that they are, in this case, kurd. you can check out Principles of Turkism for that line of argument. it is another proof that the turkish state is and has been an active enforcer of policies of genocide and terrorism directed against kurds for the purpose of genocide.
as such, it is only fitting that turkey be placed on "The List."
My support for the armed struggle is in fact not just a 'carte blanche' for war, but rather for the RIGHT of the Kurds to keep and maintain a guerrilla force that can, IF and WHEN needed, protect and fight for their rights. Any 'solution' to the Kurdish problem that seeks to deny the Kurds their right to maintain a guerrilla force is suspicious...
exactly so, Nistiman. it would appear to me that we are in agreement.











