Posted: Sun Jan 07, 2007 9:00 pmReport: Turkey needs plan B to be ready for division of Iraq
The New Anatolian / Ankara
08 August 2006
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Turkey should be prepared for a possible division of Iraq and develop a plan B, said a recent report published by a major Turkish think-tank. It urged the Turkish government about the need for a new approach towards the Iraqi Kurds and northern Iraq.
The Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO), in a 33-page report on Iraq, criticized Ankara's current policy and gave recommendations on a new approach.
"The ideal choice for Turkey could well be a united Iraq with a strong central government consolidating its power in all parts of the country, including northern Iraq. But developments show the contrary," the report said. "In these conditions Turkey needs plan B."
Stressing that Turkey so far failed to adapt its Iraq policy to the rapidly changing conditions in Iraq and the region, the think-tank warned that without a policy change in the short term Ankara will face grave problems stemming from northern Iraq.
"An independent Iraqi Kurdistan is not necessarily a threat to Turkey. On the contrary, it could be a major advantage," the report claimed.
"The worst scenario for Turkey wouldn't be the division of Iraq but chaos and civil war in northern Iraq, the case now in the south. Should that happen Turkey would then border a region where there's civil war and the [terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party) PKK could also reap the benefits of that."
The think-tank proposed the Turkish government take new measures to stop alienating the Iraqi Kurds and win their confidence. It made the following 15 recommendations:
1) Turkey's wrong policies towards the region are alienating it from the Iraqi Kurds, creating permanent fear among them of Turkey and pushing them to seek support from other countries. Ankara needs to reverse this trend soon by taking confidence-building measures.
2) The Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens' interests don't necessarily contradict each other. It's in Turkey's interests to bring the Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens as close as possible. But in Turkey some political groups are deliberately trying to portray differences between the Turkmens and Kurds as being greater than they really are for domestic consumption. But in fact this not only undermines Turkey's interests in northern Iraq but also fuels a greater risk of polarization in Turkey between ethnic Kurds and others.
3) Ankara needs to do immediate work for greater economic integration between Turkey and northern Iraq. This would give Turkey more leverage in possible future scenarios in Iraq -- a united or divided one.
4) It's not in Turkey's interests to let other countries increase their domination in this region. But today countries like the U.S., Israel, Britain, Russia and Iran and many others are undertaking extensive intelligence work in the region and trying to influence the Iraqi Kurdish regional government. Added to which, in a large part of the region neither the central Iraqi government nor the Kurdish regional government have effective control. Turkey, meanwhile, has got very behind in increasing its influence in the region.
5) Northern Iraq has become an important element which could influence the domestic balances in Turkish politics. If Turkey doesn't draw up new policies towards the region, the region's impact on Turkey will be more dramatic.
6) Turkey should stop a small security-oriented group from dominating the development and implementation of policies on the Turkmens and Kurds. Such policies have to date failed to unite the Iraqi Turkmens and instead caused further divisions among them.
7) Some Turkish groups and units sent to northern Iraq have abused their financial and political power for their individual interests or ideological goals. It has become clear that northern Iraq is consistently and increasingly becoming a more prominent factor in new crime gangs in Turkey. The weapons and money transfers involved all recent political criminal activities in Turkey, from the Atabeyler gang to the shooting of a Council of State judge, were all from northern Iraq.
Some groups in Turkey are carrying out secret talks with foreign intelligence officials in northern Iraq in their personal interests or to achieve their ideological goals.
9) Turkey should introduce new mechanisms and channels to its new approach towards the Iraqi Kurds. These should include improving bilateral contacts, increasing trade volume, offering scholarships to Iraqi Kurdish students and starting TV broadcasting in Kurdish and Arabic.
10) Turkey's new policy towards the Iraqi Kurds should focus on two points. First of all, Turkey has to show the Iraqi Kurds that it isn't hostile towards them and that, on the contrary, it will defend them. Secondly, Ankara has to show its determination to combat the PKK. But Turkey is currently giving counter messages. The majority of Iraqi Kurds seem to perceive Turkey as their main obstacle and, on the other hand, believe Ankara is not strong or courageous enough to combat the PKK.
11) Iraqi Kurds, in the long term, can contribute to Turkey's efforts to combating separatist terrorism but for that there needs to be official authority, the political will and security forces ready to combat terrorism. If central government cannot do so, it should be done by the regional government. Turkey should not miss the larger picture by focusing too much on and limiting itself to the issue of Iraq's territorial integrity.
12) Since Turkey is unwilling to train Iraqi Kurdish militias (peshmerga), this is being done by the U.S. and Israel. But Turkey's military and police are the most experienced in the field and are currently training hundreds of foreign students.
13) Turkey should prioritize avoiding terrorism and civil war spreading to northern Iraq. It should also try to contribute to stopping conflict among the Shiites and Sunnis. The civil war in Iraq is pushing Iraqi Kurds to be more independent of regional countries and more dependent more on foreign powers like the U.S., Israel and Britain.
14) Turkey should make itself and the southeast more attractive to the Iraqi Kurds. Ankara should draw up a plan on that.
15) The Iraqi Kurds shouldn't be perceived as limited to two main groups under Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Iraqi Kurdistan region President Massoud Barzani. Ankara should develop its relations with other Iraqi Kurdish groups as well and support plurality. Ankara also needs to find ways to talk with the Iraqi Kurd public and not limit communication to just with its leaders.
The New Anatolian / Ankara
08 August 2006
Font Size: default medium large
Turkey should be prepared for a possible division of Iraq and develop a plan B, said a recent report published by a major Turkish think-tank. It urged the Turkish government about the need for a new approach towards the Iraqi Kurds and northern Iraq.
The Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO), in a 33-page report on Iraq, criticized Ankara's current policy and gave recommendations on a new approach.
"The ideal choice for Turkey could well be a united Iraq with a strong central government consolidating its power in all parts of the country, including northern Iraq. But developments show the contrary," the report said. "In these conditions Turkey needs plan B."
Stressing that Turkey so far failed to adapt its Iraq policy to the rapidly changing conditions in Iraq and the region, the think-tank warned that without a policy change in the short term Ankara will face grave problems stemming from northern Iraq.
"An independent Iraqi Kurdistan is not necessarily a threat to Turkey. On the contrary, it could be a major advantage," the report claimed.
"The worst scenario for Turkey wouldn't be the division of Iraq but chaos and civil war in northern Iraq, the case now in the south. Should that happen Turkey would then border a region where there's civil war and the [terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party) PKK could also reap the benefits of that."
The think-tank proposed the Turkish government take new measures to stop alienating the Iraqi Kurds and win their confidence. It made the following 15 recommendations:
1) Turkey's wrong policies towards the region are alienating it from the Iraqi Kurds, creating permanent fear among them of Turkey and pushing them to seek support from other countries. Ankara needs to reverse this trend soon by taking confidence-building measures.
2) The Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens' interests don't necessarily contradict each other. It's in Turkey's interests to bring the Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens as close as possible. But in Turkey some political groups are deliberately trying to portray differences between the Turkmens and Kurds as being greater than they really are for domestic consumption. But in fact this not only undermines Turkey's interests in northern Iraq but also fuels a greater risk of polarization in Turkey between ethnic Kurds and others.
3) Ankara needs to do immediate work for greater economic integration between Turkey and northern Iraq. This would give Turkey more leverage in possible future scenarios in Iraq -- a united or divided one.
4) It's not in Turkey's interests to let other countries increase their domination in this region. But today countries like the U.S., Israel, Britain, Russia and Iran and many others are undertaking extensive intelligence work in the region and trying to influence the Iraqi Kurdish regional government. Added to which, in a large part of the region neither the central Iraqi government nor the Kurdish regional government have effective control. Turkey, meanwhile, has got very behind in increasing its influence in the region.
5) Northern Iraq has become an important element which could influence the domestic balances in Turkish politics. If Turkey doesn't draw up new policies towards the region, the region's impact on Turkey will be more dramatic.
6) Turkey should stop a small security-oriented group from dominating the development and implementation of policies on the Turkmens and Kurds. Such policies have to date failed to unite the Iraqi Turkmens and instead caused further divisions among them.
7) Some Turkish groups and units sent to northern Iraq have abused their financial and political power for their individual interests or ideological goals. It has become clear that northern Iraq is consistently and increasingly becoming a more prominent factor in new crime gangs in Turkey. The weapons and money transfers involved all recent political criminal activities in Turkey, from the Atabeyler gang to the shooting of a Council of State judge, were all from northern Iraq.
Some groups in Turkey are carrying out secret talks with foreign intelligence officials in northern Iraq in their personal interests or to achieve their ideological goals.
9) Turkey should introduce new mechanisms and channels to its new approach towards the Iraqi Kurds. These should include improving bilateral contacts, increasing trade volume, offering scholarships to Iraqi Kurdish students and starting TV broadcasting in Kurdish and Arabic.
10) Turkey's new policy towards the Iraqi Kurds should focus on two points. First of all, Turkey has to show the Iraqi Kurds that it isn't hostile towards them and that, on the contrary, it will defend them. Secondly, Ankara has to show its determination to combat the PKK. But Turkey is currently giving counter messages. The majority of Iraqi Kurds seem to perceive Turkey as their main obstacle and, on the other hand, believe Ankara is not strong or courageous enough to combat the PKK.
11) Iraqi Kurds, in the long term, can contribute to Turkey's efforts to combating separatist terrorism but for that there needs to be official authority, the political will and security forces ready to combat terrorism. If central government cannot do so, it should be done by the regional government. Turkey should not miss the larger picture by focusing too much on and limiting itself to the issue of Iraq's territorial integrity.
12) Since Turkey is unwilling to train Iraqi Kurdish militias (peshmerga), this is being done by the U.S. and Israel. But Turkey's military and police are the most experienced in the field and are currently training hundreds of foreign students.
13) Turkey should prioritize avoiding terrorism and civil war spreading to northern Iraq. It should also try to contribute to stopping conflict among the Shiites and Sunnis. The civil war in Iraq is pushing Iraqi Kurds to be more independent of regional countries and more dependent more on foreign powers like the U.S., Israel and Britain.
14) Turkey should make itself and the southeast more attractive to the Iraqi Kurds. Ankara should draw up a plan on that.
15) The Iraqi Kurds shouldn't be perceived as limited to two main groups under Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Iraqi Kurdistan region President Massoud Barzani. Ankara should develop its relations with other Iraqi Kurdish groups as well and support plurality. Ankara also needs to find ways to talk with the Iraqi Kurd public and not limit communication to just with its leaders.
I heard once that if Kurds would build their country in Argentina or anywhere in the world the Turks would come and destroy it immediatly. Turkey was the only one who banned the Kurdish language and culture 