Democratic solution in turkey?

[tomjez]

Cheryl: great text about armed struggle, damn well written, I agree with a lot of your points, but once again I disagree with the opportunitty of an armed struggle in Turkey.

One other thing I disagree with

since pkk had laid down its weapons from 1999 to 2004 and, since during that time, no democratic opposition was permitted to the kurds by the turkish state

HADEP was forbidden by turkish state, with the help of PKK who did not like the idea of a democratic non PKK organization. HADEP was torpedoed by PKK, and DEHAP was created instead. 31 June 1996, second general assembly of the HADEP (arrested), some guys brought a PKK flag on the tribune. Bozlak and other were arrested, but not the provocators...weird?

You will say : "no it is the same". Here is my point: ALL mayors elected on the HADEP list in 1999 were removed in 2004 for the municipal elections. Exemple Feridun Celik (HADEP) in Diyarbakir, very popular, wanted to be elected again but PKK forbid it and put Osman Baydemir instead. Celik was supported by Murat Bozlak (ex HADEP), who has been declared a "traitor" by Öcalan many time. Some PKK cadres said about him "Nothing can be done with bozlak, he is an intellectual" (which says a lot...)

Can I say that in 2004 DEHAP lost Agri, Van, Bingöl and Siirt to the AKP? Compared to 2002 score for legislative elections it even lost 1,5 %.

A lot of Kurdish voices (Yasar Kaya (ex DEP) for exemple said that PKK/DEHAP strategy was stupid (alliance with an insignifiant turkish party, SHP) and that all the direction should resign! The president of SHP (leader of the coaltion, who was in Tansu Ciller government if I can add...) said it was Massoud Barzani and Jelal Talabani's fault if SHP/DEHAP lost (I must say I did not get that!!!)

This strategy was ordered by öcalan and transmitted by his lawyers. OH! Funny, they were not allowed to see him for monthes, and suddenly could meet him in January 2004, 2 months before the elections.

AKP won a lot of kurdish cities in the last elections. 60% of kurdish vote in Kurdistan, and a progression in all cities (from 17% to 35% in Diyarbakir)


I'll quote a turkish journalist who is known for his democratic commitment, Mehmet Ali Birand (I disagree with a lot of points with him, especially about Armenian Genocide!!!!, but he really advocates a democratic solution to kurdish problem)

What is certain in any case, is that as long as PKK will be able to control the political parties who are popular among our kurdish citizens, a democratic solution to the kurdish problem will be difficult

We can talk for ages about armed struggle, but I think it would be interesting to talk about democratic solution and purely political game. Turkey is under pressure by UE and can not forbid parties as it used to. The problem is that when kurdish PKK opponents want to create a party they are in trouble (remember this murder in Diyarbakir of a political opponent this summer...)

So what do you think?

[Piling]

Since the electoral success of the HADEP and its mayors, the PKK had decided to make ban the HADEP for they could not control it enterely. They were jealous of its popularity and Öcanalan did not accept any other Kurdish leader in Turkey.
After 1999, it had been decided by Turkey and Öcalan to fire all the HADEP leaders and replace them by PKK members or Turkish politicians.
It was the case in the last elections. Then the DEHAP failed.
Each attempt to found a Kurdish independant party had been prevented; sometime by Turkish politics (an idiot policy) sometime by PKK's line. So Kurds in Turkey lack terribly of representatives who could be accepted by Turkey as by EU.

[cheryl]

So what do you think?

what do i think? i think you must be a diplomat, tomjez: "great post on another thread, cheryl, and we could argue forever about armed struggle but let's change the subject."

for which foreign service do you work?

reading your points here, i still think that i am correct in supporting the right to armed struggle because i do not think that democratic means negate the right to armed struggle any more than law within society negates the right to self-defense.

we can have this discussion, however i am not very good for serious posts during the week. i will try to get back to this in more detail on the weekend, when i have the luxury to think more deeply.

if that is all right with you.

[tomjez]

AHAH you must read other post I wrote to see that I am not diplomatic at all! So when I say something nice I mean it

[cheryl]

AHAH you must read other post I wrote to see that I am not diplomatic at all! So when I say something nice I mean it

which other post would that be?

anyway, to business:

tomjez writes:

HADEP was forbidden by turkish state, with the help of PKK who did not like the idea of a democratic non PKK organization. HADEP was torpedoed by PKK, and DEHAP was created instead. 31 June 1996, second general assembly of the HADEP (arrested), some guys brought a PKK flag on the tribune. Bozlak and other were arrested, but not the provocators...weird?

not weird at all, considering that anyone can carry a PKK flag, including a grey wolf. so HADEP was accused of and banned for alleged "separatism" and "supporting terrorism" because of alleged support for PKK which HADEP has always denied. given the turkish state track record on all things kurdish, i am inclined to be extremely skeptical of charges brought by the turkish state and bringing into the picture the element of waving a PKK flag at a HADEP meeting is merely frosting on the cake. too much frosting, a telltale signature of the ham-handed approach to kurds that characterizes kemalism. . . and the provocateurs were not arrested, you say? case closed. the state is guilty.

ALL mayors elected on the HADEP list in 1999 were removed in 2004 for the municipal elections.

I don't suppose this might have had anything to do with the fact that in 2003, DEHAP changed it's platform, whereby it declared its intention to no longer be a party advocating for greater kurdish rights in turkey but will, instead, be a party of all turks. it also stated its intention to enter into alliances with other parties. therefore, is it any surprise that DEHAP sought and created an alliance with SHP? since it had stated its intention to enter into alliances with other parties in the previous year, how is it a surprise, alleged PKK manipulations and provocations notwithstanding?

additionally, since it no longer stood for advocating greater rights for kurds in turkey, why should anyone vote for a previous kurdish party that had formed an "alliance with an insignificant turkish party, SHP?" why not instead try to rally support for a larger party, i.e. AKP, which at least would have the ability to ensure greater state support for improving infrastructure and social services? if you are between a rock and a hard place with respect to political aspriations, you do what people do the world over--you vote for the lesser of two evils in order to try to get something out of the bad situation. in saying this i do not mean that AKP has done anything significant in improving the lives of kurds living in turkish-occupied kurdistan, but it seems completely reasonable to me that the voters hoped they would get something.

except for my comment about "alleged PKK manipulations and provocations," you may have noticed that in the preceeding paragraphs i did not mention PKK specifically as being involved with DEHAP or the DEHAP/SHP alliance. this is because the election results can be explained without the usual kemalist-driven PKK hysteria. of course, i had the advantage of listening to professor nicole watts, of san francisco state university, speak about this election. she was an observer of the campaign and actual elections in amed. she travelled with osman beydemir on his campaign trail and she indicates that beydemir was also "very popular." she quotes radikal: "Indeed, the soft-spoken, 33 year-old Baydemir, an ethnic Kurd and a lawyer by training, was considered such a sure winner that Radikal, one of the country's national dailies, opined that there was "no need to have an election" in Diyarbakir."

http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sov ... kkurds.htm

DEHAP itself never earned immunity from harassment by the turkish state--in spite of it's change in platform and rhetoric. i could say the same for PKK, even though it also shows a pattern of evolution over time, despite what its most implacable critics claim. The funny thing is that DEHAPs changes reflect PKKs policy changes as it moved through its KADEK phase and into its KONGRA-GEL phase. odd? proof of collaboration between DEHAP and PKK? well, so what if DEHAPers and PKKers are talking together and sharing ideas? i have stated before that i do not believe that PKK can be excluded from a political solution and i believe that. if you followed professor watts' article which i referenced above, you will notice that she mentions the devotion of the youth to PKK and that youth make up a large proportion of the kurdish population in turkish-occupied kurdistan. how will anyone cut out a generation from the political process, unless it is by time-tested kemalist methods of armed force, murder, disappearances, etc?

what does it mean that the youth of turkish-occupied kurdistan are supportive of PKK? it means they are polarized and radicalized by the actions of the turkish state, especially over the last twenty years, and they see PKK as being the only power to confront the injustices. this generation is here to stay and they are going to become the political players of the future. this guarantees that there will have to be a dialog between those who see something meaningful in PKKs existence and those who follow the knee-jerk reaction of the terrorist label. whether or not that dialog fully enters the political realm or remains illegal, but still fueling the fires of kurdish ambition "underground" is something that remains to be seen.

does this mean that i approve of everything PKK has done or with all of its policies? no, i do not, and i thought in my response to Nistiman that fact was fairly clear because i was in agreement with what Nistiman had to say, including the caveat about criticisms of PKK policies but not those policies centering on the issue of the use of violence.

nor do i approve of the wholesale condemnation of PKK especially since the most grievous offenders are, in fact, the most grievous offenders, i.e. the turkish state, the us state department, and the supporters of both. these are the ones who continually hold up the long-suffering, peace-loving turkish state as eternal victim while, at the same time, never managing a single mention of the atrocious behavior of the same long-suffering, peace-loving turkish state which created a need for an organization like PKK to begin with. just take a look at the behavior of the turkish state in the 1960s and 70s alone, to see how perfectly they created the vacuum into which PKK could freely flow because there was a need for kurdish self-defense against a genocidal regime. i simply cannot take seriously anyone who condemns PKK outright without condemnation of the turkish state or an acknowledgement of the behaviors of the turkish state which created this whole ugly situation for kurds, and that includes all the so-called "experts."

here i am only scratching the surface in my complaint because i have not gone into the question of the moral obligations and responsibilities of the state to those a state claims as its citizens. i believe that any such question is intimately linked to the question of the morality, legitimacy and obligation of a people to defend itself.

((by the way, the comments of murat karayalcin vis-a-vis barzanî and talabanî are typically turkish. more finger-pointing and use of the blame game for one's own failure. perhaps both DEHAP and SHP were hoping that their alliance would hearken back to the days of the DEP/SHP alliance. but those were the long-gone days when SHP was one of the leading turkish parties. i guess that, in between fighting each other and fighting PKK in the south, barzanî and talabanî were working overtime at eroding SHPs relevance to turkish voters in turkey as part of some worldwide kurdish conspiracy. i bet murat karayalcin also believes that ufos are filled with little green men from mars.))

which brings me to your opening comment:

I agree with a lot of your points, but once again I disagree with the opportunitty of an armed struggle in Turkey.

when, may i ask, do you agree with the opportunity of an armed struggle by kurds? i will also point out, as an aside, that your statement still avoids Nistiman's core issue, the legitimacy of armed struggle. what is the point of the legitimacy of armed struggle in the abstract? what is the point of discussion of a "democratic solution and purely political game" for those who have not had time to breathe, much less consider such abstractions? which is the question that brings me back from this little aside to your comment about opportunity.

to quote a famous rabbi: if i am not for myself, who is? if i am only for myself, what am i? and if not now, when?

i admit that when operations did once again resume, i asked, "why now?" i suppose i asked this because so much was happening at the time--spring 2004--with the serhildan in syrian-occupied kurdistan, elections in turkish-occupied kurdistan, everything in liberated kurdistan. on the other hand, PKK had declared a ceasefire, waited for five years while announcing ahead of time that the ceasefire would end at a certain time. . . december, 2003, if i remember correctly. . . and then didn't really start operations again until the spring of 2004. so turkey got a one-sided grace period to go along with a one-sided cease fire. the PKK laid down its weapons in 1999. the pashas lifted military law in 2002. ample time has existed to engage politically and democratically on the part of ankara, but what happened? nothing. no dialog. no improvement of infrastructure. no improvement of social services. no program to return those villagers who were forced to flee their destroyed villages. no attempt to create jobs for the millions who fled to the cities and now live, in many cases, below the subsistence level.

thus the rabbi's question, ". . . if not now, when?"

i have seen a report this week which states that many have been graduated from a PKK military academy and they are projecting many new recruits for the next year. certainly, this may be propaganda--or may not--but it contains one huge kernel of truth which i have observed: the lack of economy, the lack of a decent means of survival which would be consistent with kurdish culture in turkish-occupied kurdistan. PKK can obviously feed recruits, clothe them and give them work. as long as this situation remains, PKK will have as many recruits as it can handle. who knows? maybe they'll be back to their former personnel levels fairly soon.

It looks like PKK is giving the rabbi an answer. That should give Ankara. . . and the EU. . . something to think about.

[tomjez]

in saying this i do not mean that AKP has done anything significant in improving the lives of kurds living in turkish-occupied kurdistan,

It's not what they're saying...end of the "état d'urgence" was a big relief, everybody says that.

and the provocateurs were not arrested, you say? case closed. the state is guilty.

Well again it's not what Hadep say. Bozlak said it was definitely PKK member who did it. And the fact that they were not arrested is not surprising.

she travelled with osman beydemir on his campaign trail and she indicates that beydemir was also "very popular."

Indeed, best way to have an objective point of view. I was in a conference in Bruxelles 1 month before the elections, and DEHAP and PKK were very very popular as well, also it was a lot of different associations (Kongra Gel, Dehap, KNK, Kon Kurd, Kurdish parliament in exile) with no links with each other! I remember this lovely old belgian senator saying "öcalan is like a nelson mandela for middle east! Turkish authorities have to free him, he IS peace"

well, so what if DEHAPers and PKKers are talking together and sharing ideas?

DEHAP is PKK, even THEY say it in private...

[Vladimir]

Indeed, best way to have an objective point of view. I was in a conference in Bruxelles 1 month before the elections, and DEHAP and PKK were very very popular as well, also it was a lot of different associations (Kongra Gel, Dehap, KNK, Kon Kurd, Kurdish parliament in exile) with no links with each other! I remember this lovely old belgian senator saying "öcalan is like a nelson mandela for middle east! Turkish authorities have to free him, he IS peace"

What was his name? Hugo van Rompaey ?? Lol

[tomjez]

Don't remember. He was ridiculous. "Le président öcalan est un homme de paix"

"président Ocalan is a man of peace" Exact same words that another asshole of "Kon-Kurd" (following my informations he spent 3 months in the guerilla and was sent in Europe because he was too bad ) told me in KNK office in Bruxelles: "President Apo is the Nelson Mandela of Middle east".

"president": they really talk like if he had been elected by someone....

[cheryl]

It's not what they're saying...end of the "état d'urgence" was a big relief, everybody says that.

i have absolutely no disagreement with that point, tomjez.

Well again it's not what Hadep say. Bozlak said it was definitely PKK member who did it. And the fact that they were not arrested is not surprising.

okay, if you want to go there. . . let me ask you, why do you say it was not surprising that a PKK member was not arrested for bringing a PKK flag to the platform of the HADEP meeting? that is meant to be a serious question, not a theoretical one.

I was in a conference in Bruxelles 1 month before the elections, and DEHAP and PKK were very very popular as well, also it was a lot of different associations (Kongra Gel, Dehap, KNK, Kon Kurd, Kurdish parliament in exile) with no links with each other!

what do you mean when you say that all these groups had no links with each other? are you saying it facetiously?

because, for one thing, KNK merged with KADEK to form KGK (KONGRA-GEL), so to say that the people of those groups have no links to each other must be a case of facetiousness, especially since KADEK was PKK. as far as i know, KNK has always had members who were PKK or, at the very least, PKK supporters or sympathizers, as well as those members who were not PKK and weren't so sympathetic to the organization.

PKK was the largest single grouping within the parliament-in-exile . . . there has been a heavy PKK influence even in kurdish media, such as MED-TV. PKKers or PKK sympathizers in DEHAP? again, i say, "so what?" neither ideas nor sympathies exist in a vacuum.

you see, tomjez, this is why i'm convinced that it is impossible to reach a solution without PKK being involved. even if there is some sort of "purge" and every outward sign of PKK is removed from all of this kurdish political structure, how does one know if one has gotten rid of every single person that harbors even the slightest sympathy for the organization? PKK--even if it disappears overnight--has left an imprint that will never go away and it doesn't matter if you or i like it, don't like it or are neutral.

as for the belgian senator, well, he has his opinion.

[tomjez]

Yes I was being facetious

Ok I see your point. Yes it would be hard to get rid of all PKK influence, but my opinion is (and maybe I'm too optimistic) that a loooot of kurds support PKK only because there is no other choice. And because criticizing the PKK is dangerous and can cost your life.

even if there is some sort of "purge" and every outward sign of PKK is removed from all of this kurdish political structure, how does one know if one has gotten rid of every single person that harbors even the slightest sympathy for the organization?

Of course I agree with you. But I think that if all kurds can realize that Big Apo is a "man of the past" and can move on, it would be a big step forward. And I say because I really care about Kurds in Turkey, and that I hate seeing young kurds dying for nothing in the mountains. And you will maybe say I'm a "friend of turkish army" but I hate seeing youg guys making their military service diying on some stupid landmine. Because I have a lot of turkish friends, who are democrats, who have nothing against kurds and who are forced to make their military service, sometimes in Kurdistan if they are unlucky...

[cheryl]

i have no problem with facetiousness, tomjez, i just want to make sure i am reading correctly when i think i see it.

Ok I see your point. Yes it would be hard to get rid of all PKK influence, but my opinion is (and maybe I'm too optimistic) that a loooot of kurds support PKK only because there is no other choice. And because criticizing the PKK is dangerous and can cost your life.

but criticizing the TC is also dangerous and can cost your life. in fact, you don't have to criticize, you just have to speak a truth that isn't approved by the TC, i.e. orhan pamuk, recently, as one example.

i don't know that it is so much criticism itself that is the problem. i think that it may have something to do with the manner of the criticism. there have been many wild accusations thrown at PKK and many times these are out of proportion or the sources of the evidence are tainted. also, the PKK has been a very polarizing and complex thing. people tend to either love it or hate it, but it is possible also to see it in context and this is what i try to do. i admit it may be easier for me since i tend toward favoring it, which you probably already know, and i do not consider it a terrorist organization. i also know that there is enough non-tainted evidence to show that it has done some sh*tty things in the past, including the recent past (let me add that PKK is not the only kurdish party to engage in sh*tty behavior sometimes. in fact, it is not the only political organization to engage in sh*tty behavior.). i would be overjoyed if PKK would get rid of some of its old habits and i think that it has enough influence that it could truly renew itself and kurdayetî in bakur.

a lot of kurds from turkish-occupied kurdistan do support PKK to greater or lesser extent because, as i have pointed out, PKK has been a great influence. as i have also pointed out, the TC made it easy for PKK to be the only player on the field, so to blame this influence totally on PKK or ocalan, especially with the accusation that PKK or ocalan have always ensured great influence through less than honorable means, is to go too far. another point is that there are very few bakurî who have not had relatives in the organization and this helps to make an association with PKK something personal for many of them.

And I say because I really care about Kurds in Turkey, and that I hate seeing young kurds dying for nothing in the mountains. And you will maybe say I'm a "friend of turkish army" but I hate seeing youg guys making their military service diying on some stupid landmine. Because I have a lot of turkish friends, who are democrats, who have nothing against kurds and who are forced to make their military service, sometimes in Kurdistan if they are unlucky...

whether you are or are not a friend of the turkish army is something i don't know and it doesn't really matter to me because your position vis-a-vis the turkish army does not change my opinion about the turkish army, the turkish government, the pashas, the PKK, ocalan or kurds in general. i will agree with you that it is extremely unfortunate that these young turks must go to kurdistan to die. it is also extremely unfortunate that kurds have been dying in kurdistan since long before you, or even i, were born. ismail besikci was one of those "unlucky" ones to have his service in kurdistan, wasn't he?

But I think that if all kurds can realize that Big Apo is a "man of the past" and can move on, it would be a big step forward.

there is a very simple way of doing that and you wouldn't have to dis apo in the process. in fact, it would be better without dissing apo. this should have been done immediately after apo's capture but i think it could still be done--again, because of PKKs influence. i do believe they could carry it off and be in a much better position if they did. then, of course, we have the kemalist thing. . .

i have saved this part for last, as you can see, because i have the feeling that you suspect something between the TC and PKK/ocalan but you aren't saying what it is that's on your mind. i asked you previously, "why do you say it was not surprising that a PKK member was not arrested for bringing a PKK flag to the platform of the HADEP meeting?" you have said that a PKK member was not arrested and that it was not a surprising thing. what do you think is up with all of that?

[tomjez]

Yes I think there is something between Turkey and PKK since 1999. Turks used öcalan as a way to control PKK, because they saw öcalan was a coward (I love Atatürk / I don't want to die).

The fact that PKK resumed fighting in june 2004, I.E after 2 years of unprecedent (and very incomplete) democratic reform is for me a sign that there is a kind of agreement between extremist parts of the army and "deep state" and the PKK.

About the flag incident, I think that Neither PKK nor the state were keen to see a democratic independent kurdish party. why?

Because PKK has always wanted to be the ONLY kurdish voice (and öcalan the ONLY one deciding inside the PKK)

Because fascists in turkey think its much better that the only voice of kurds is PKK, because thanks to that they can say that Kurds are all terrorits.


Let's not caricature turkey: A lot of people criticize openly the miltary, the government, even stubborn kemalism in the press today. If Orhan Pamuk has a trial on his ass, it is not a decision of the government but of some stupide judge somewhere in turkey. Things are moving fast in turkey, and there is a growing part of people who speak openly about "KURDS" "KURDISTAN" without facing problem. A LOT of things changed,

whether you are or are not a friend of the turkish army

Shit of course I'm not! If an organization like PKK had a chance to exist, it is thanks to fascists and military in Turkey. PKK is the mirror of turkish fascism and cult of personnality.

as i have also pointed out, the TC made it easy for PKK to be the only player on the field

Totally agree. It is much easier to control this kind of party than a mass democratic one. because: they knew PKK would NEVER be able to secure an independant kurdistan (huge turkish army against guerilla), that the main part of the fightings would be on kurdish territory (so they don't care) and that the fact that PKK would eliminate all opposition, especially the intellectuals was a good thing for them...

Moreover PKK is the perfect argument for all undemocratic laws in turkey: let turkish people think that the turkish nation is in permanent danger, that republic has to be saved, blablabla, is a justification for military power, huge army budget, lack of liberty...exactly what Sarkozy does in France today: playing with people fear to justify a police state.

[cheryl]

this business of the state using ocalan is, i think, the heart of the problem, because this is a leader who is obviously seriously compromised from a security viewpoint in a military context, as well as a political one. it could have been handled quite easily by PKK, if they had continued to honor ocalan in a symbolic sense while at the same time restructuring the hierarchy of the party.

we could get into a discussion of the whole idea of the "charismatic leader" (i.e. your mention of "cult of personality") which i think does apply to ocalan, especially since PKK still claims to follow the orders of ocalan, even though it is questionable--as some of your examples point out--that these orders are beneficial for kurds or kurdistan. of course, there is also the question of kemalist control and use of ocalan in order to dominate the kurdish situation even more thoroughly.

certainly i think that ocalan has been a very charismatic leader and has encouraged the cult of personality. on the other hand, plenty of kurds, including those involved with PKK have lived in the west and have seen a different way of political action and are quite capable of engaging in that kind of action. i think that this is reflected in the evolution of PKK from what it was initially. witness the organizational ability of PKK supporters in europe.

however, personality cult and the idea of charismatic leader or a leader for the sake of himself is something that i disagree with because i see kurdistan herself as a greater good, something truly to be desired in and of itself as a means of guaranteeing the survival of the kurdish people. to place the good of apo above the good of kurdistan is heresy, so to speak, in my opinion.

i do not believe that the kemalists need a pretext to engage in anti-kurd policies, however, because they did so long before ocalan or PKK ever arrived on the scene. kemalists are anti-kurd in their essence, according to their founding ideology. was it PKK or ocalan's fault that the kemalists crushed dersim? was it PKK or ocalan's fault that kemalists developed sun language thesis or turkish history thesis? of course not. these all result from kemalist ideology and paranoia--an indicator of a fascist ideology.

as far as PKK being a mirror of kemalism (or of personality cult). . . i don't know that "mirror" is the precise word for comparison although i believe i have an idea of what you mean to say. i think it is certainly a reaction to the turkish state and is undoubtedly influenced by the turkish milieu. . . but as a mirror? i don't know. i have to think about that some more.

about change, especially between 2002 and 2004, yes, i will agree it is very incomplete and i don't think it has been so much the result of kemalism or pkk as it has been the result of eu accession. as far as kurdistan goes, i think it wasn't so much change as it was the lifting of military law.

Let's not caricature turkey: A lot of people criticize openly the miltary, the government, even stubborn kemalism in the press today. If Orhan Pamuk has a trial on his ass, it is not a decision of the government but of some stupide judge somewhere in turkey. Things are moving fast in turkey, and there is a growing part of people who speak openly about "KURDS" "KURDISTAN" without facing problem. A LOT of things changed,

this is why i try to be careful and use terms like "turkish state," "TC," "turkish military," "pashas," "turkish government," even "deep state," etc. i think two of the most positive things to happen recently are 1) the armenian conference held by intellectuals in istanbul and 2) egitim sen insisting on instruction in mother languages. writers, journalists, film makers, etc., have also contributed to the change, but to see this come from teachers is very positive. it indicates that ordinary people are beginning to act, which is a positive thing for both turks and kurds.

Moreover PKK is the perfect argument for all undemocratic laws in turkey: let turkish people think that the turkish nation is in permanent danger, that republic has to be saved, blablabla, is a justification for military power, huge army budget, lack of liberty...exactly what Sarkozy does in France today: playing with people fear to justify a police state.

PKK is no more a perfect argument for undemocratic law than any of the turkish leftist groups, who are still active, or the islamists or even gray wolves. it was the crackdown on far right-wing groups in the fifties that led to the rise of the far left in turkey, which led to the government cracking down on the left, which cleared the field for PKK, which, in turn, was the impetus for the rise of islamist groups. . . who were assisted in helping to wipe out PKK by the turkish government.

it has been a constant battle of extremes since the beginning and i think this is due to the founding, fascist ideology because it does not seem to me that fascism allows for moderation, reason, political compromise. . . no, as i wrote that word, "compromise," i realized that this is exactly what fascism opposes. can you think of any fascist regime that encouraged compromise as a policy?

this battle of extremes brings me back to the idea of the "mirror." i think the idea of extremism makes me think more of action and reaction than it does mirrored behavior.